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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Appellees have, in their brief, for whatever reason confused the facts, 
Appellants set forth the following facts in the matter before the court: 
1. The buyers, Marvin and Marilyn Chemow, were represented by Kay Berger, 
Inc. with a regard to their search for a home to purchase. (Amended Complaint, 114; ROA at 
17.) 
2. Kay Berger, Inc. and Marvin and Marilyn Chemow (Buyers), Appellees, 
submitted an earnest money agreement to the Sellers through David Hooper (Appellant) a real 
estate agent affiliated with Mansell & Associates (Appellant). (ROA at 17-18.) 
3. The offer submitted by appellees was a full-price offer. Because it contained 
conditions, the earnest money agreement submitted by buyers was a counter-offer to the sellers 
unilateral offer to sell as set forth in the multiple listing agreement. (ROA at 17-18.) 
4. Originally, one of the sellers (the husband) executed the earnest money offer 
accepting the buyers counter-offer. (ROA at 17-18.) 
5. Very shortly thereafter, the remaining seller (the wife) decided not to execute 
the earnest money agreement. (ROA at 19.) 
6. There is no evidence one way or another as to the reason that the wife (seller) 
determined not to execute the earnest money offer. (ROA at 19.) 
7. The appellees and the court below, have conveniently filled in that blank and 
argued that the wife of the seller did not sign the earnest money agreement because she had not 
signed the multiple listing agreement. (ROA at 171-73; Appendix 2.) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
No evidence exists as to the issue of why the seller's wife refused to 
execute the Earnest Money Agreement. 
The appellees argument that appellants are liable for a sales commission because 
appellants did not obtain the sellers' wifes' signature on the multiple listing agreement is both a 
non-sequitur and a red-herring. To determine what all of the parties rights and duties are in the 
transaction, it is essential to decide factually why the transaction failed. In the case before the 
court, because the matter was not permitted to go to trial on the issue, there is no evidence as 
to why the transaction failed. At a very minimum, for appellees to prevail, they would have had 
to show evidence, through affidavit or otherwise, that the sellers refused to complete the earnest 
money agreement as a result of the appellants' (Hooper & Mansell) failure to obtain the seller's 
wife's signature on the multiple listing agreement. 
Even if the appellants had been required to obtain the seller's wife's name on the 
multiple listing agreement (which is not the case (See Guillotte v. Pope & Quint, Inc., 349 So.2d 
62 (Ala.Q.App. 1977); Woodworth v. Vranizan, 539 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Ore. 1975); and Greer v. 
Kooiker, 253 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. 1977)) appellees would still be required to show that the 
absence of the signature was the reason for the sales' failure, that in fact the seller's wife's 
signature was not required on the multiple listing agreement. That evidence does not exist. This 
is as much a case of no evidence as it is one of disputed, controverted factual issues. 
Apparently, appellees assume that the only reason the sale would not have gone forward was 
because of a lack of a multiple listing signature by the seller's wife. (Such assumptions are never 
warranted under Rule 56.) 
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Hypothetically, and aside, there could have been numerous reasons why the sellers 
decided not to go forward which would have undoubtedly come out at the trial of this matter. 
Some examples are: 
1. The buyer submitted a counter-offer which included conditions that each of the 
sellers did not agree with; 
2. The sellers decided they had not asked enough money for their house and did 
not want to go through with the sale; or 
3. The sellers decided they wanted to continue to reside in their residence. 
If in fact the buyers believed they had submitted a full-price offer, without 
conditions, that was enforceable, the law is very clear in Utah and in other jurisdictions that 
buyers could have sued sellers to enforce their acceptance of the unilateral offer and enforce the 
agreement. It is curious that the sellers are not parties to the lawsuit before this court. The only 
logical reason that the sellers were not made a party to the lawsuit is that buyers were not sure 
they wanted to go through with the sale or were not sure they had submitted an actual acceptance 
of a unilateral offer and desired to buy another house which they ultimately accomplished. 
n. 
A real estate agent is not a guarantor or sale. 
Under the unanimous case law of every jurisdiction which has decided the issue, 
the appellants were not required to get both of the owners' signatures on the multiple listing 
agreement. (See Guillotte v. Pope & Quint, Inc., 349 So.2d 62 (Ala.Ct.App. 1977); Woodworth 
v. Vranizan, 539 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Ore. 1975); and Greer v. Kooiker, 253 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. 
1977) The courts have consistently stated that once one of the owners signs, they warrant or 
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guarantee that the other will sign, and that he has authority to list the property. The appellees 
have failed to establish in any manner the exact reason why the sale did not go forward and have 
failed to establish the purpose that the sale failed. Under such circumstances, the logical 
extension of appellees argument is that the realtor/appellant becomes a guarantor of all sales. 
In this case, the further extension of appellees' argument is that appellants would have been 
required to sue their client to enforce what the appellees thought were the terms of a binding 
contract. Clearly, no such requirements exist on realtors. 
m. 
Factual disputes exist which preclude Summary Judgment. 
Appellants argue vainly that there are no factual issues because appellants adopted 
facts as set forth in appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellees argue, despite 
unanimous case law to the contrary, that reasonable reliance is not a question of fact. The 
questions of fact in this case which prohibit Summary Judgment are as follows: 
(a) What were the conditions set out in the buyers' earnest money agreement and 
were they conditions that amounted to something more than an acceptance of the sellers' 
unilateral offer to sell as set out in the multiple listing agreement? 
(b) Why did the seller refuse to go through with the transaction (was it because 
the seller had not signed the multiple listing agreement, which would not have been a valid 
reason to not go through with the transaction (See appellants' brief))? 
(c) Could the sellers have enforced the earnest money agreement submitted to the 
buyers? 
(d) Was appellants' "promise" reasonably expected to induce reliance under all 
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the of the facts and circumstances which appellees submit they were not aware of until prior to 
the "recision" of the earnest money agreement? 
CONCLUSION 
Even if the appellants had been required to obtain the signature from the seller's 
wife on the multiple listing agreement, which is contrary to the unanimous case law in the 
country, on the record before the court there are inherent unresolved questions of fact with regard 
to why the transaction didn't close. There is no evidence any where in the record to even suggest 
that the sellers did not perform because the multiple listing agreement had not been signed by 
one of the sellers. As a matter of law, the Third Judicial District's decision in this matter, must 
be overturned and appellees' claims dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of January, 1996. 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
David O. Black, Att^n^ibf^efendants 
and Appellants ^ ^ ^ 
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